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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-TIMELINESS
OF CLAIMS OR APPEALS-The West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals has held that all time limitations under the West Virginia
Workmen's Compensation Act are procedural and not jurisdic-
tional, thus allowing consideration of otherwise untimely claims
upon a showing of justifiable reason for delay.
Bailey v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, 296
S.E.2d 901 (W. Va. 1982).
The West Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act' provides that
appeals from any final decision of the Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Board may be prosecuted to the supreme court of appeals
within thirty days from the date of issue.2 In Bailey v. State Work-
men's Compensation Commissioner,' the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals issued what it termed a landmark interpretation
of the time limitations under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
declaring them all to be procedural guidelines and not jurisdic-
tional prerequisites. Strict compliance with the time limits is no
longer necessary for review of an award by the court.5
The court consolidated appeals from three decisions of the State
Workmen's Compensation Commissioner.' In the first case the
Commissioner denied Kay Chapman permanent partial disability
1. W. VA. CODE §§ 23-1-1 to 23-6-1 (1981).
2. Id. § 23-5-4.
3. 296 S.E.2d 901 (W. Va. 1982).
4. Id. at 905.
5. Id. at 902. Under the West Virginia's Workmen's Compensation Act, employers and
employees are required to file reporting forms with the Commissioner after each accident.
W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1a, b. The State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner is empowered
to determine from the information supplied if the injury or disease claimed arose in "the
course of and resulting from employment." Id. § 23-4-1. Appeals upon the making or refus-
ing to make an award, or upon the making of any modification or change with respect to
former findings or orders must be made in writing within thirty days of the Commissioner's
decision. Within fifteen days of the receipt of written objections, the Commissioner must set
a hearing date for the taking of evidence after which the Commissioner must render his final
decision within thirty days. Id. § 23-5-1. Thereafter, an aggrieved party may file a written
notice of appeal with the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board within thirty days after
receipt of the Commissioner's final decision. Id. § 23-5-3. The Board may affirm, reverse, or
remand the decision of the Commissioner after an evidentiary hearing or hearings. Id.
Should issue be taken with the Board's findings, the aggrieved party may appeal to the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, as noted in the text. Id. § 23-5-4.
6. 296 S.E.2d at 902.
809
Duquesne Law Review
benefits,7 and the Workmen's Compensation Board upheld the
Commissioner's determination in an order dated September 30,
1981.8 Chapman, who had been represented by counsel before the
Commissioner and the Board, filed a pro se appeal dated Novem-
ber 2, 1981 which was received by the supreme court of appeals on
November 6, 1981.9 It was thus untimely, having been both written
and received more than thirty days from the date of the Appeal
Board's final order.10
Delmar Berry received notice on March. 31, 1981 that the Board
had denied his application for workmen's compensation benefits.1
He acknowledged receipt of this final order in a letter directed to
the Worker's Compensation Fund (from which benefits are paid),
dated April 27, 1981 and received by the Commissioner the follow-
ing day."2 Berry's notice of appeal, however, although also dated
April 27, 1981, was not received until October 26, 1981. It was al-
most identical to his letter of the same date acknowledging receipt
of the Board's order, the only difference being the addition of lan-
guage protesting the Board's determination.'3 Both letters were
signed by Berry and his attorney, and no reasons were given for
the delay in delivery of the second letter."' Berry's appeal was,
therefore, also untimely.16
The third appellant, Eugene Bailey, was awarded five percent
permanent partial disability status on December 30, 1971 for a
work-related injury suffered on March 22, 1971.16 After further
proceedings, Bailey's disability award was increased to thirty per-
cent and then to sixty percent permanent partial disability. 17 In
7. Id. at 903. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-6(e) provides in part: "If the injury causes perma-
nent disability less than permanent total disability, the percentage of disability to total dis-
ability shall be determined and the award computed on the basis of four weeks' compensa-
tion for each percent of disability determined . Id.








16. 296 S.E.2d at 903. See supra note 7.
17. 296 S.E.2d at 903. W. VA. CODE §§ 23-4-16 provides that the "power and jurisdic-
tion of the commissioner over each case shall be continuing and he may from time to time,
after due notice to the employer, make such modifications or changes with respect to former
findings or orders as may be justified. . . ." W. VA. CODE § 23-5-1(a) requires that "any
party dissatisfied with any such modification or change so made by the commissioner shall,
upon proper and timely objection, be entitled to a hearing, as provided in section [23-5-1] of
Vol. 22:809
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both awards, previous temporary total disability payments were
subtracted from the increased permanent partial disability pay-
ments.' 8 On July 1, 1971-three months after Bailey's injury, but
before the date of the Commissioner's final order-the provision
mandating these subtractions was amended to remove the require-
ment.1 9 On July 11, 1978, the supreme court of appeals ruled in
Campbell v. State Workmen's Compensation Commission0 that
the amendment could be applied retroactively to cases arising
before its effective date so long as the final order of the Commis-
sioner was made subsequent to the date of the amendment. 21 Bai-
ley petitioned the Commissioner on October 15, 1978 to restore the
deductions taken from his previous awards. This petition was de-
nied and the Appeal Board affirmed the Commissioner's decision
on January 19, 1981.22 Bailey filed a timely appeal from this deci-
sion, but none was taken from the decision of April 19, 1977 which
had originally reduced the awards.2 3
The supreme court of appeals agreed to hear these cases "in or-
der to consider whether to adhere to prior decisions holding that
non-compliance with directory time limitations of the Workmen's
Compensation Act erects a jurisdictional hurdle that can never be
overcome."'" In deciding to remove the jurisdictional hurdle, the
court expressly overruled every case decided under the Workmen's
Compensation Act which had interpreted the time limitations con-
tained in the Act as jurisdictional 25 and every case which had man-
this article." Id.
18. 296 S.E.2d at 903. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1c provides in part:
The commissioner shall determine whether or not the claimant has sustained a com-
pensable injury within the meaning of section [23-4-1] of this article, and may com-
mence payment of temporary total disability benefits as provided herein immediately
upon receipt of the employer's report of injury when the employer's report clearly
indicates a compensable injury that will last longer than three days and shall com-
mence such payment within fifteen days upon receipt of the employee's or the em-
ployer's report of injury, whichever is received sooner, and receipt of either a proper
physician's report or any other information necessary for a determination.
Id.
19. 1971 W. Va. Acts 177 (codified at W. VA. CODE § 23-4-6 (1981)).
20. No. 14157 (W. Va., July 11, 1978) (per curiam order).
21. 296 S.E.2d at 908.
22. Id. at 903.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 902.
25. Id. See, Spaulding v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 157 W. Va. 849, 205 S.E.2d
130 (1974); Baker v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 143 W. Va. 536, 103 S.E.2d 391
(1958); Whited v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 131 W. Va. 646, 49 S.E.2d 838 (1948);
Bowdler v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 124 W. Va. 629, 22 S.E.2d 359 (1942).
1984
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 22:809
dated compliance with such time limitations.2 6
The court began with a consideration of the existing case law.
Noting that the early practice of literal application of limitation
periods as a jurisdictional bar27 had been rejected in Lester v.
State Workmen's Compensation Commission,28 the court con-
cluded that its prior holdings precluded a literal application in the
instant cases.29 Next, the court characterized the jurisdictional the-
ory of limitation periods as a judicial construction not usually
mandated by statute.3 0 The court stated that the statutory lan-
guage at issue was only directory, 1 then reviewed the history of
the development of the jurisdictional theory and concluded that it
arose from an early misconception of the nature of workmen's
compensation statutes.3 2 The misconception, the court explained,
derived from the belief that in order to satisfy now discredited
constitutional standards, compensation programs had to appear
voluntary and a claimant's right to "participate" in the compensa-
tion program depended on his satisfaction of statutory require-
ments.38 Finally, the court noted that recent decisions under the
Act showed the court's disenchantment with the jurisdictional doc-
trine34 and concluded that "the silence of the legislature, [and] the
26. 296 S.E.2d at 903. See, Nichols v. State Comp. Comm'r, 111 W. Va. 34, 160 S.E.
854 (1931); Myers v. State Comp. Comm'r, 110 W. Va. 425, 138 S.E. 512 (1931); Enyart v.
State Comp. Comm'r, 109 W. Va. 613, 155 S.E. 913 (1930).
27. See, e.g., Sudraski v. State Comp. Comm'r, 116 W. Va. 441, 181 S.E. 545 (1935),
where the court stated: "A limitation qualifying a special statutory right is generally held to
be unaffected by the disabilities and excuses which allay ordinary statutes of limitation, and
to be such an inherent part of the statute which creates the right, that the right itself does
not survive the limitation." Id. at 441, 181 S.E. at 545.
28. See 242 S.E.2d 443 (W. Va. 1978) expressly overruling Sudraski v. State Comp.
Comm'r, 116 W, Va. 441, 181 S.E. 545 (1935).
29. 296 S.E.2d at 904.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 905. See W. VA. CODE § 23-5-4: "From any decision of the board ... an
application for review may be prosecuted ... to the Supreme Court of Appeals within
thirty days from the date thereof. (emphasis added).
32. 296 S.E.2d at 904.
33. Id. See, e.g., Greer v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 123 W. Va. 270, 277, 15 S.E.2d
175, 178 (1941) (Kenna, J., dissenting) for an explanation of the early view of compensation
programs.
34. 296 S.E.2d at 905. See, e.g., Spaulding v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 157 W.
Va. 849, 205 S.E.2d 130 (1974), where the court determined that non-compliance with a rule
requiring use of a particular form prepared by the Appeal Board was a procedural error that
did not deprive the Appeal Board of jurisdiction. Id. at 854, 205 S.E.2d at 133. Although the
court did not disturb the jurisdictional effect of the time limitations under the Act, it ob-
served that "[a] proper decision . . . requires, in addition to a reading of the pertinent stat-
ute and rules and regulations of the appeal board, an examination and thoughtful considera-
tion of the purpose and spirit of the workmen's compensation laws." Id. at 852, 205 S.E.2d
1984 Recent Decisions 813
logical flaws attendant on abiding by the jurisdictional doctrine"
compelled its abandonment.3 5
The court next prescribed the limits of its holding. After cau-
tioning that "unjustified disregard of rules must, in deference to a
policy that demands some point of repose for claims, result in for-
feiture, '3 6 the court proceeded to establish a standard for the eval-
uation of untimely claims. Drawing an analogy to the procedural
rules used in the West Virginia courts, the court held that:
[A]fter a statutory period has run a claimant or his legal representative may
be excused from failure to file timely notice under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act for any of the following reasons: innocent mistake, excusable neg-
lect, unavoidable cause, any fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct of
an adverse party, or any other reason justifying relief from the running of
the time period.88
The court noted that the new rule already prevailed with reference
to notice of claims, and specifically extended it to include notice of
appeal. 39 The court then outlined a bifurcated procedure for filing
a late claim or appeal. The late claimant or appellant shall append
to the tardy document an affidavit setting forth the reasons for the
delay.'0 The tribunal before which the claimant seeks relief then
must make a preliminary determination, independent of the merits
of the claim, as to whether waiver of the prescribed time period is
warranted. 41 The determination must balance the "compelling
needs for certainty, finality, and orderly administrative procedure
at 132.
35. 296 S.E.2d at 905.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Rule 60(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 37(b)
of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 60(b) reads in part:
Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; unavoidable cause; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud; etc.-On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve
a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, or unavoida-
ble cause; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether here-
tofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of
an adverse party...; (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. ...
W.VA. CODE Vol. 1A, Court Rules 60(b) (1982).
Rule 37(b) states in part: "Upon a showing of excusable neglect, the decreeing court may,
before or after the time has expired, with or without motion and notice, extend the time for
filing the notice of intent to appeal otherwise allowed to any party. Id. Rule 37(b).
38. 296 S.E.2d at 905.
39. Id. n.4.
40. Id. at 906.
41. Id.
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which the time periods were enacted to satisfy" against "the com-
pensatory nature of the Workmen's Compensation Act and the
consequent importance of full and fair hearings on the merits of
claims brought under the act."'42 The court took pains to confine its
holding solely to the limitation periods contained in the Work-
men's Compensation Act, stating that while literal application of
statutory periods of limitation is unarguably due most statutory
provisions, such rigorous application is inappropriate to the Work-
men's Compensation program since the compensation program
does not create statutory rights, but instead replaces common law
rights with statutory remedies.
43
Providing further guidance for practitioners and subordinate
tribunals, the court defined its understanding of the mitigating cir-
cumstances justifying relaxation of the statutory time periods.
Stating that fraud, mistake, and unavoidable cause are usually
readily apparent,44 the court adopted a strict standard45 for deter-
mining when neglect can be considered excusable and cited the
need for some sanction to be imposed on those who do not exercise
due diligence.4 6 The court reiterated the necessity for balancing
any legitimate reliance interest on the part of the employer against
the excuse of the claimant, stating that a late claim cannot be al-
lowed if the delay has caused prejudice to the employer.47
Finally, the court turned to a disposition of the three appeals
before it. Noting that Kay Chapman's was a pro se appeal, and
citing a recent decision's allowing for a three-day mailing period as
an addition to the thirty-day period in which appeals may be filed,
the court concluded that it was excusable neglect in the case of a
pro se appeal for the claimant to have confused the date of the
42. Id. Should the tribunal accept the reasons given for the delay, it may presumably
proceed to decide the case on the merits. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 907.
45. Id. The court stated that:
[C]ounsel should not expect an application [for relief from missed time periods] to be
granted when failure to act was due to simple inadvertence or a mistake regarding
[the time periods] or unfamiliarity with them. Excusable neglect seems to require a
demonstration of good faith on the part of the party seeking an enlargement and
some reasonable basis for noncompliance. Absent a showing along these lines, relief
will be denied.
Id. at 907 n.8 (citing 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1165
(1969)).
46. 296 S.E.2d at 907.
47. Id.




letter with the date of appeal.4 It then determined from the facts
before it that Chapman was entitled to the relief she sought.50
In Delmar Berry's case, no reason was given for the delay in re-
ceipt of his letter of protest."1 The court remanded his case to the
Commissioner with instructions to examine the reasons for the de-
lay and to decide whether the delay was excusable.52
The court found Eugene Bailey's failure to file a timely appeal
from the order deducting temporary total disability payments from
his permanent partial disability award excusable. 3 It noted that
the law requiring such deductions had been amended before the
date of the order granting Bailey permanent partial disability ben-
efits, but that the decision permitting retroactive application of the
law to claims not yet finalized had not been announced until July,
1978."1 The court stated that "to hold now that a claimant's appeal
was meritorious (although he did not know it) but that the claim
was foreclosed because the time period ran out before our decision
gave claimant notice of its merit" would make a mockery of the
court's prior decision.5 5 The case was remanded to the Commis-
sioner with orders to restore the deductions.
56
In reaching its decisions on the merits of the cases before it, the
court utilized the experiences of other jurisdictions faced with sim-
ilar factual circumstances. In two footnotes," the court surveyed
the status of limitations periods elsewhere. After noting that the
position adopted in the instant case was the prevailing rule gov-
erning notice of claims, the court characterized as surprising the
fact that relaxation of limitations periods governing appellate re-
view was not as prevalent as that governing notice of claims.59 In-
deed, the court termed the existing case law from other jurisdic-
49. 296 S.E.2d at 908. With the addition of the three-day mailing period, Kay Chap-
man's letter, dated November 2, 1981, was written before the expiration of the appeal pe-
riod, the Appeal Board having affirmed the Commissioner's decision thirty-two days before,
on September 30, 1981.
50. Id. Kay Chapman was denied permanent partial disability benefits despite the tes-
timony of three of four doctors that she was indeed permanently partially disabled as a
result of a work related injury. Id. The court termed the denial of benefits "clearly wrong."
Id.
51. Id. at 903.
52. Id. at 908.
53. Id.
54. Id. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
55. 296 S.E.2d at 908.
56. Id. at 909.
57. Id. at 905 n.4, 906 n.5.
58. Id. at 905 n.4.
59. Id.
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tions a "gallery of horrors"6 because of the nearly universal rule of
strict compliance with statutorily prescribed time limitations for
appeal. 61 Only Arizona, the court noted, observed a less stringent
interpretation of limitations periods.62 In fact, a comparison of the
Arizona rule cited by the court with the rule it announced in the
instant case reveals that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals has adopted substantially the same interpretation of the time
limitations under the West Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act
as that adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court under the Arizona
Workmen's Compensation Act.63 Moreover, since the three Arizona
cases cited by the court 4 were decided well before the instant case,
the experience which Arizona has had in administering its proce-
dural innovation should indicate the difficulties which may be en-
countered under the West Virginia court's new rule. Unfortu-
nately, as will be indicated, the difficulties Arizona experienced
appear to have been substantial.
The first breach in the theretofore impenetrable defense of un-
timeliness was announced by the Arizona Supreme Court in Par-
sons v. Bekins Freight,65 a decision which overturned a substantial
body of Arizona case law on the point.66 There, petitioner was
nearing the end of his eligibility for benefits under the Arizona
60. Id. at 906 n.5.
61. Id. at 906. The court cited the following cases as supporting strict compliance:
McKenna v. Industrial Comm'n, 42 Colo. App. 305, 596 P.2d 405 (1979) (holding untimely a
petition for review mailed in sufficient time to allow for timely delivery, but arriving one day
late); Argonaut Ins. v. Hamilton, 146 Ga. App. 195, 245 S.E.2d 882 (1978) (holding an appeal
received at the Capitol post office on the last day of the appeal period, but not delivered
until the next day, untimely); Lockard v. Workmen's Comp. Bd., 554 S.W.2d 396 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1977) (dismissing an appeal filed two days late even though the order appealed from
was not mailed until four days after it was rendered); Yancy v. Texas Gen. Indem., 425
S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (holding late receipt of a petition for review untimely even
though mailed in sufficient time to allow for timely delivery); Smith v. Department of Labor
and Indus., 23 Wash. App. 516, 596 P.2d 296 (1979) (dismissing an appeal because notice of
appeal was not timely served on both the clerk of court and the Department as required by
statute, even though notice was timely served on the court). 296 S.E.2d at 906 n.5
62. 296 S.E.2d at 906 n.5.
63. Compare Janis v. Industrial Comm'n, 111 Ariz. 362, 363, 529 P.2d 1179, 1180
(1974) ("if a claimant appears to have a meritorious position and the facts do not establish
an excessive delay and the delay, itself, does not in some way prejudice the insurance car-
rier, the interests of justice require that the untimeliness of the filing be waived.") with
Bailey, 296 S.E.2d 901, 906-08 (W. Va. 1982).
64. In addition to Janis v. Industrial Comm'n, 111 Ariz. 362, 529 P.2d 1179 (1974), the
court cited Chavez v. Industrial Comm'n, 111 Ariz. 364, 529 P.2d 1181 (1974) and Parsons v.
Bekins Freight, 108 Ariz. 130, 493 P.2d 913 (1972). 296 S.E.2d at 906 n.5.
65. 108 Ariz. 130, 493 P.2d 913 (1972).
66. Id. at 132. 493 P.2d at 915.
816
1984 Recent Decisions 817
statute67 when he was involved in an automobile accident which
aggravated the existing injury.68 The insurance carrier, upon learn-
ing of the automobile accident, terminated petitioner's benefits,
and notified him of this action by mailing the statutorily pre-
scribed notice.69 Petitioner filed an appeal from the termination of
benefits, which was dismissed on the basis of untimeliness by the
hearing officer, the Industrial Commission, and the Arizona Court
of Appeals.7 0 The Arizona Supreme Court granted petitioner's re-
quest for review to consider whether failure to timely file a request
for a hearing deprived the Industrial Commission of jurisdiction to
hear the case.7'
In determining that the Commission had jurisdiction, the court
utilized a policy argument. In an earlier case,72 the court had de-
clared that the Commission could relieve a claimant of the conse-
quences of a failure to timely file a claim for compensation, where
circumstances warranted relief.7s The court concluded that the
same considerations warranted adopting the rule for appellate pro-
cedure, 4 since the termination notice "was not a model of clarity
and could well have been characterized as ambiguous.
'75
In the companion cases of Janis v. Industrial Commission7 6 and
Chavez v. Industrial Commission,77 the Arizona Supreme Court
67. Arizona Workmen's Compensation Act, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-901 to 23-1091
(1970).
68. 108 Ariz. at 130, 493 P.2d at 913-14.
69. Id. at 131, 493 P.2d at 914. The notice read: "NOTICE TO CLAIMANT: If you
are aggrieved by this notice you may apply for a hearing by filing a written application at
any office of the Industrial Commission of Arizona with [sic] sixty (60) days after the date of
mailing of this notice." Id.
70. 108 Ariz. at 131, 394 P.2d at 914. The appeal procedure under the Arizona Work-
men's Compensation Act is found at ARMz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-941 to 23-952 (1970). Per-
tinent provisions for consideration here are as follows:
"A hearing on any questions relating to a claim shall not be granted unless the employee
has previously filed an application for compensation within the time and manner prescribed
by § 23-1061, and such request for a hearing is filed within sixty days .. " Id. § 23-947
(1970) (a 1980 amendment substituted "ninety days" for "sixty days;" the current version is
found at § 23-947 (1983)).
"[N]o application for compensation shall be valid or claim thereunder enforceable unless
notice of an accident resulting in an injury shall be given by the employee . . . [or by a
representative] . . . to the commission in writing within one year after the injury...." Id. §
23-1061 (1970) (codified as amended at § 23-1061 (1983)). See infra note 102.
71. 108 Ariz. at 131, 493 P.2d at 914.
72. Parsons v. Industrial Comm'n, 98 Ariz. 74, 402 P.2d 20 (1965).
73. Id. at 76, 402 P.2d at 22.
74. 108 Ariz. at 131, 493 P.2d at 914.
75. Id. at 132 n.*, 493 P.2d at 915 n.*.
76. 111 Ariz. 362, 529 P.2d 1179 (1974).
77. 111 Ariz. 364, 529 P.2d 1181 (1974).
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specifically expanded its earlier rule to all situations where a claim-
ant protests, seeks review, rehearing, or reconsideration of any or-
der or award, and adopted a test for determining when such relief
is appropriate.7"
In Janis, certain of the petitioner's injury claims were found to
be non-compensable by the hearing officer. 79 Rather than filing an
immediate appeal, Janis twice communicated with the insurance
carrier by letter, protesting the termination of his benefits.8 0 He
did not, however, file an appeal from the adverse decision until
eight days after the appeal period under the statute had expired.
8 '
The appeal was dismissed by the Industrial Commission as un-
timely filed, and this decision was subsequently affirmed by the
court of appeals .8  The Arizona Supreme Court reversed, citing
Parsons v. Bekins Freight,8 and remanded the case to the Indus-
trial Commission to consider whether the delay was excessive or
unfair in its consequences to the insurance carrier, and whether
the facts of Janis' case warranted relief.
8'
In a similar fashion, the court determined that relief from the
limitations period was warranted in Chavez v. Industrial Commis-
sion,85 where the petitioner's claim for relief was based upon the
discovery of a clerical error in the computation of benefits to which
he was entitled. 86 The court noted that its earlier holdings 7 de-
clared that short delays were the least important aspect of the test
and reiterated that the reviewing tribunal must determine whether
the facts appear to warrant relief, and whether the insurance car-
rier has been prejudiced by the delay. 8
The final judicial pronouncement in the evolution of the Arizona
rule came in Kleinsmith v. Industrial Commission," which clari-
78. 111 Ariz. at 363, 529 P.2d at 1180. ("[t]he test is that if a claimant appears to have
a meritorious position and the facts do not establish an excessive delay and the delay, itself,
does not in some way prejudice the insurance carrier, the interests of justice require that the
untimeliness of the filing be waived.") See supra note 63.
79. 111 Ariz. at 363, 529 P.2d at 1180.
80. Id. The insurance carrier had previously accepted the injury as compensable, and
was therefore paying the statutory benefits. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 108 Ariz. 130, 493 P.2d 913 (1972).
84. 111 Ariz. at 363, 529 P.2d at 1180.
85. 111 Ariz. at 364, 529 P.2d 1181 (1974).
86. Id. at 365, 529 P.2d at 1182.
87. The court cited Parsons v. Bekins Freight, 108 Ariz. 130, 493 P.2d 913 (1972). and
Janis v. Industrial Comm'n, 111 Ariz. 362, 529 P.2d 1179 (1974).
88. 111 Ariz. at 365, 529 P.2d at 1182-83.
89. 26 Ariz. App. 77, 546 P.2d 346, af'd mem., 113 Ariz. 189, 549 P.2d 161 (1976).
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fled a seeming ambiguity in the test as announced in Janis and
Chavez. Petitioner Kleinsmith sought appellate review of a deci-
sion by the Industrial Commission dismissing her claim for bene-
fits as untimely.'0 Kleinsmith had suffered a myocardial infarction
while on the job, which the insurance carrier had found to be non-
compensable because not work-related and because the claim was
not timely filed.' 1 Petitioner then requested a hearing before the
Industrial Commission under the rule of Parsons v. Bekins
Freight." The request was granted, with the sole issue for consid-
eration being whether the facts surrounding petitioner's delay in
filing her claim warranted waiving the limitations period for filing
such claims. 8 The hearing officer concluded that since Kleinsmith
had presented no reason for her failure to timely file, there was no
reason to waive the limitations period.' 4
On appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Kleinsmith argued
that language in Chavez" had modified Parsons to require that in
all instances where there is an untimely filing, the Commission
must consider the merits of the petitioner's claim for compensa-
tion-not the merits of the excuse for delay-before reaching a de-
cision on waiving the time limitations.' 6 The court rejected this po-
sition, noting that "if the requirement were only to show a prima
facie case, the vast majority of claimants would have little diffi-
culty."'97 The court concluded that the limitations period would be
all but obliterated as hearing officers would be forced, under peti-
tioner's proposed test, to balance the reasons for delay with the
merits of the underlying claim, presenting "an impossible standard
to apply.""' The only logically consistent interpretation, according
to the court, is that "the term 'meritorious position' must refer to
the reasons for the late filing and not the merits of the claim.""
Thus did the test adopted by the West Virginia Supreme Court
90. 26 Ariz. App. at 78, 546 P.2d at 347.
91. Id.
92. 108 Ariz. 130, 493 P.2d 913 (1972).
93. 26 Ariz. App. at 78, 546 P.2d at 347.
94. Id.
95. "'[I]f a claimant appears to have a meritorious position and the facts do not es-
tablish excessive delay and the delay would not in some way prejudice the insurance carrier,
the interests of justice require that the Commission waive the untimeliness of the filing.'"
26 Ariz. App. at 78, 546 P.2d at 347 (quoting Chavez, 111 Ariz. at 365, 529 P.2d at 1182)
(emphasis supplied).
96. 26 Ariz. App. at 79, 546 P.2d at 348.




Duquesne Law Review Vol. 22:809
of Appeals in Bailey v. State Workmen's Compensation Commis-
sioner develop in Arizona. In brief summary, an untimely claim is
subjected to a bifurcated proceeding. First, the claimant is permit-
ted to introduce evidence supporting mitigation of the claim's un-
timeliness, and a decision is rendered on the merits of claimant's
reasons for delay. 00 Should the limitations period be waived as a
result of claimant's argument, the merits of the claim for compen-
sation are heard and decided.10'
The development of the Arizona case law came to an abrupt
halt, however, when the Arizona State Legislature amended the
Arizona Workmen's Compensation Act to forbid consideration by
the Industrial Commission or the courts of untimely filed claims or
appeals, subject only to three equitable defenses.'02 The amend-
ment had the effect of abolishing the Kleinsmith test.103 The min-
100. See Bailey, 296 S.E.2d at 906; Kleinsmith, 26 Ariz. App. at 80, 546 P.2d at 349.
101. Bailey and Kleinsmith strongly imply that a hearing on the merits of the com-
pensation claim follows immediately upon favorable decision on waiver of the limitations
period. See Bailey, 296 S.E.2d at 906; Kleinsmith, 26 Ariz. App. at 80, 546 P.2d at 349. In
Bailey the West Virginia court noted that "[t]he tribunal before which the claimant or his
legal representative seeks to be heard shall make a preliminary decision, independent of the
merits of the claim, as to whether excuse of the delay is warranted." 296 S.E.2d at 906
(emphasis supplied). In Kleinsmith, the court never reached the issue because the appeal
was heard on the basis of refusal to waive the limitations period. 26 Ariz. App. at 78, 546
P.2d at 347. Neither the Arizona nor the West Virginia court has even explained the proce-
dural niceties of practice under the rule adopted by each. From Kleinsmith, it is apparent
that an appeal may be taken from denial of the preliminary relief sought (i.e., waiver of the
limitations period). Presumably West Virginia will also allow for such an appeal.
102. 1980 Ariz. Sess. Laws 246, §§ 24, 36 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-947,
23-1061(A) (1983)). The amendments were effective January 1, 1981 and read in pertinent
part:
A. A hearing on any question relating to a claim shall not be granted unless the em-
ployee has previously filed an application for compensation within the time and in
the manner prescribed by § 23-1061 [within 90 days of receipt of determination by
the commission] ...
B. . . .The industrial commission or any court shall not excuse a late filing unless
any of the following apply:
1. The person to whom the notice is sent does not request a hearing because of
justifiable reliance on a representation by the commission, employer or carrier.
2. At the time the notice is sent the person to whom it is sent is suffering from
insanity or legal incompetence or incapacity, including minority.
3. The person to whom the notice is sent shows by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the notice was not received.
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-947 (1983).
Section 23-1061 was amended in similar fashion: "[N]either the commission nor any court
shall have jurisdiction to consider a claim which is not timely filed under this subsection,
except [by reason of the equitable defenses in § 23-947]. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1061
(1983).
103. McKaskle v. Industrial Comm'n, 135 Ariz. 168, 170, 659 P.2d 1313, 1315 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1982).
Recent Decisions
utes of the committee meetings held to consider this amendment,
though sparse, are revealing as to the reasons surrounding the re-
jection by the Arizona Legislature of the interpretation of the stat-
ute by the Arizona Supreme Court. They also have important im-
plications in West Virginia, where the supreme court of appeals
apparently adopted the Arizona line of cases in ignorance of the
fact that they had been mooted by legislative action.10 4
The minutes of the meetings held by the Committee on Com-
merce and Labor of the Arizona State Senate indicate that "[t]he
changes in the workmen's compensation laws are an effort to ob-
tain some cost containment measure to allow employers to con-
tinue to operate in Arizona and attract new employers to locate
[there].' ' 5 One of the cost containment measures which figures
prominently in the amendment was "setting time limits on filing of
claims and requests for hearing."'0 6 In the Arizona State House of
Representatives, similar reasons were expressed. 10 7
It thus appears that simple economics dictated the decision by
the Arizona legislature to reverse that state's supreme court and
reimpose strict limitations on the time for filing claims and appeals
under the Arizona Workmen's Compensation Act. Employers
found the Arizona Supreme Court's liberal interpretation of the
statute too costly and were politically powerful enough to have it
changed.
The experience of Arizona does not bode well for West Virginia.
The rule adopted in Bailey v. State Workmen's Compensation
Commissioner can only increase the costs to employers in the
state, as they now must defend otherwise untimely claims and the
appeals generated by claimants whose requests for waiver of the
limitations period are denied. Other decisions by the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals have already seriously eroded the posi-
104. The Arizona amendments were effective January 1, 1981. See supra note 102.
Bailey was decided by the West Virginia court on June 24, 1982. The first reported Arizona
case mentioning the amendment is Cohen v. Industrial Comm'n, 133 Ariz. 24, 648 P.2d 139
(1982), decided April 29, 1982, which did not apply the amended statute since the injury at
issue occurred before the effective date of the amendment. The first case specifically detail-
ing the effect of the amendment was McKaskle, 135 Ariz. 168, 659 P.2d 1313 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1982), which was not decided until November 30, 1982.
105. Hearing on S.B. 1001 Before the Committee on Commerce and Labor, Ariz. State
Sen., (February 7, 1980) (remarks of Mr. Michael Green).
106. Id.
107. Hearings on S.B. 1001 Before the Committee on Commerce, Ariz. State H.R.
(March 24, 1980) (remarks of Mr. Robert Robb) ("Mr. Robb, Arizona Chamber of Com-
merce, spoke in favor of the bill and stressed the need for a filing deadline and the economic
justifications for the bill.").
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tion of employers in that state."'8 The relatively prosperous state
of Arizona was unable, or unwilling, to support the increased costs
of a judicially liberalized workmen's compensation act. How then,
can West Virginia, with the highest rate of unemployment in the
nation, 0 19 expect to do so? The court in Bailey noted that "[ilf the
legislature does intend to have strict time limitations, they can
amend the statutes to express that intent explicitly . . . .,,o The
Arizona legislature has accepted this judicial challenge. Perhaps it
is time for the West Virginia legislature to do likewise.
John A. McCreary, Jr.
108. See, e.g., Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus. Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978) (holding
that an employer acts with deliberate intent to produce an injury or death and thereby loses
his immunity from common law actions by employees whenever the employer's conduct con-
stitutes an intentional tort or willful, wanton, or reckless misconduct); see generally, Flan-
nery, Beeson, Bradley & Goddard, The Expanding Role of the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals in the Review of Workmen's Compensation Appeals, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 1
(1978).
109. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that in June, 1983, the unemploy-
ment rate in West Virginia was 17.5%. The rate in Arizona for the same period was 10.3%.
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, STATE AND AREA EMPLOY-
MENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT STATISTICS (August 16, 1983).
110. 296 S.E.2d at 907.
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